The IT department cannot protect an organisation that does not know its own processes. Why collaboration between security, business and users is the control that makes all the other controls effective, and how to build it without turning it into an annual memo.
What Nostr is, how a protocol without central servers works, and why the privacy it promises is real but has precise limits that nobody talks about. With the specification read at the source, the history, and the three ways it can be compromised.
From cables to applications, in four layers and without shortcuts. Why the stack is layered and what that really means, how a packet crosses ten routers, what sets TCP apart from UDP, and the MTU and port numbers that explain half of all network problems.
A compromised Linux server is not fixed by reinstalling: first you work out how they got in, then you look for the rest. A method for finding infected files with nothing but the shell, the signals you must not ignore, and why the order of operations matters more than the tools.
A file with an appetising name, a false credential, a DNS that does not answer: none of this protects an asset, and yet it tells you who got in. The story and use of canary tokens, from cartographers to AWS containers.
Honeypot, honeynet, honeytoken, deception technology: one continuous line running from Cliff Stoll to dynamic microsegments. Why lying to the attacker remains one of the cheapest countermeasures we have.
No software is immune, but almost everything we discover does not concern us. A practical guide to triage: reachability, exposure, real exploitability and the moment when the patch really goes before everything else.